Abstract: Modern international relations have largely changed and gone through several stages of development since the Yalta-Potsdam system was established. The sphere of close attention of international actors included all new industries, which subsequently acquired their own legal framework, regulatory and discussion organizations, as result eventually becoming an integral part of the system. One of these vectors is the energy sector, the structure of which is complicated by the presence of several areas of activity, including the oil and gas industry, the thermal power complex, the coal industry, and the water sector. With the development of society, the energy sector also underwent changes and its structure included new types, such as solar and wind energy, hydrogen and nuclear industries. Each of them requires its own regulatory framework in terms of regulation in order to ensure the safety of people and the environment, taking into account the permanent development and the emergence of new technologies.

In this article, the authors consider regulation in the nuclear industry as an integral part of the international energy market and in the framework of arrival of new types of energy sources, in particular floating nuclear power plants, as well as the need for their development in the context of modern international relations.

Key words: energy, FNPP, international regulation, safety and security, IAEA, IMO.

Legal regulation in the field of the FNPP
In the context of the FNPP, I would like to focus on several of the most important topics in the context of creating their international legal regulation.
First of all, it is necessary to mention the activities of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter — IMO), in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, since throughout almost the entire life cycle, including transportation and operation, the location of an active zones of floating nuclear thermal power plants are supposed to be on the water surface.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is one of the fundamental documents in the field of regulation of legal relations in the maritime space [1]. However, despite the existence of 320 articles covering almost all the most important issues of the law of the sea, the Convention focuses only on two articles of the nuclear industry, in particular Articles 22 and 23, which deal with the rules of passage of tankers, nuclear-powered vessels or carrying nuclear substances through the territorial waters of States. At the same time, the Convention does not mention floating objects that are unable to move at the expense of their own installations and have nuclear fuel on board. For this reason, the PATEC does not fall under regulatory measures related to tankers and other vessels, as a result of which their activities are not covered by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Another equally important document is the International Convention for the Safety of Human Life at Sea (hereinafter — SOLAS) [2]. SOLAS points out the main provisions in the field of safety standards for the construction, staffing and operation of ships, as well as their belonging to certain States. In the context of this document, it is necessary to begin with the fact that it does not contain the concept of "vessel", which makes it difficult to further codify and define applicable standards in relation to the FNPP. In addition, Chapter 1, Part 3 (a) iii talks about the application of this Convention in relation to ships propelled by mechanical means, which limits the possibility of regulating floating nuclear thermal power plants due to the lack of their own engines.
However, a closer, but still not applicable definition for FNPP is indicated in the Code of Nuclear Merchant Ships, which is referred to by SOLAS in Chapter 1 of Part 2 and Chapter 7 of Part 1. Thus, the Code states that a nuclear vessel means any merchant vessel whose normal regime is based on the use of nuclear energy and characteristics which correspond to the characteristics of ships of ordinary displacement. The impossibility of reconciling these norms, as in the case of Chapter 1 of Part 3 (a) iii, lies in the absence of a definition of the PATES and the impossibility of reconciling the concepts of "merchant vessel" and "nuclear vessel" in relation to a floating nuclear thermal power plant.
Chapter 7, Part 3 of SOLAS talks about the need to comply with the norms of the International Maritime Regulations for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods (IMDG Code) regarding the transportation of dangerous goods in packaged form [3]. In particular, the IMDG Code contains detailed technical provisions on the placement, segregation of packaging, classification, labeling and designation of dangerous goods in packaged form, including Class 7 radioactive materials. In the context of the transportation of radioactive cargo, it is also necessary to mention the International Code for the Safe Transportation of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Waste in Packaging on Ships (INF Code) [4]. It contains special provisions for the design of ships carrying radioactive material and addresses issues such as damage resistance, fire protection and structural strength. The INF Code includes three classes of requirements for cargo ships, depending on the radioactivity of the cargo being transported. Therefore, according to this code, design organizations in the development and construction of the FNPP must take into account not only the necessary technological characteristics and safety requirements of the IAEA, but also the standards specified in this document for further transportation of the station from its construction site to the destination point, where it will subsequently be operated. There is a significant drawback in this approach, namely that the specified classes in the INF Code are aimed at applying to ships whose design is significantly different from that of barges and which may lead to the impossibility of stable operation of the NPP or, moreover, a decrease in radiation safety standards, as a result of which the station will not applicable to use. Moreover, the use of these rules and regulations specified in both SOLAS and IMDG Code and INF Code is complicated by their extension to cargo ships that meet certain characteristics and which do not include floating nuclear thermal power plants.
Another necessary component of the future regulatory mechanism in the field of FNPP is the MARPOL Convention, which is considered one of the main international documents on the prevention of marine pollution by ships during their operation or in case of emergency
situations [5]. As in the case of other regulatory legal acts, MARPOL has its own definition of "vessel", for example, article 2(4) states that a vessel means any watercraft operated in the marine environment, and includes hydrofoils, air cushion vehicles, underwater vehicles, stationary and floating platforms. Despite the fact that this convention, due to the existence of a broad concept of "ship", can be extended with respect to the FNPP, in some articles of the document there are references to the previously mentioned IMDG Code and the SOLAS Convention, which in turn complicates the applicability of the document on the prevention of pollution by ships to floating nuclear thermal power plants.
Summarizing all the above in terms of the extension of the regulatory regulation of the International Maritime Organization to the activities of the FNPP, it can be concluded that modern documents, due to the lack of a uniform definition of a vessel and differences in provisions regarding their application to floating nuclear thermal power plants, do not meet modern challenges and for the development of this area of nuclear energy, it is necessary to consider the use of IMO instruments as separately in in each specific case, and in the aggregate, to identify contradictions and make edits, applicable to all applicable documents. However, as many experts say, activities in the field of transportation and operation of NPP require the creation of separate documents, the content of which would be aimed solely at regulating the activities of floating nuclear power plants.
Another problem of regulating the activities of the FNPP is the consistency of the regulatory framework in the field of navigation and use of the water surface, together with the norms and rules for ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities, primarily nuclear power plants. The first document that is fundamental in the field of nuclear safety is considered to be the Convention on Nuclear Safety [6]. Despite its special significance, this document also has a problem of applicability with respect to floating stations, in particular, in article 2 "Definition" of paragraph i is given the meaning of "nuclear installation", which means "... any ground-based civilian station ...". The use of the term "land-based" negates the further application of the Convention, since the NPP, by virtue of its technical characteristics, is located on the surface of water and despite the fact that Article 3 "Scope of application" says: "This Convention applies to the safety of nuclear installations," i.e. without specifying their location, clarifying the definition of nuclear power plants, it can be concluded that it is distributed exclusively to stations whose site is located on land.
Another important part of this Convention is Article 7 "Legislative and regulatory framework", which provides for:
1. Introduction of relevant national safety requirements and regulations;
2. The licensing system for nuclear installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a license;
3. A system of regulatory control and evaluation of nuclear installations in order to verify compliance with applicable regulations and license terms;
4. Ensuring compliance with the applicable regulatory provisions and conditions of licenses, including suspension, modification and cancellation.

Article 8 "Regulatory Body" refers to the need to create a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework.
Based on Articles 7 and 8, it can be concluded that for the importing countries of the NPP, in the territorial waters of which the floating station will be located, there will be a need to comply with these two articles, which complicates the implementation of the project and potentially may affect pricing and the expediency of the location of the facility. However, returning to the concept of "nuclear installation", these requirements may not be applicable to the use of floating nuclear power plants based on the initial definition of the object of their activity. Moreover, projects using the SBI scheme have not been implemented before, which may force a review of approaches to the construction and operation of the plant in some States, especially if we are talking about the FNPP.
Thus, it can be concluded that all articles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety relate exclusively to ground-based nuclear power plants, which puts the NPP beyond the scope of its legal regulation.
All documents in the field of regulating the safety of radiation nuclear sources have a common goal, namely, "protection of people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation." This definition is given in documents No. SF-1 "Fundamental Principles of Safety", which, unlike the previously mentioned ones, covers all radiation sources and can be applied not only to ground-based nuclear power plants, but also to NPP [7]. However, the system of safety standards in the field of nuclear power plants is quite broad and is presented in various international documents, especially in the INSAG series.
The basic safety principles for nuclear Power plants described in INSAG-3 "Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants" center on the concept of deep-layered protection, which implies the use of several levels of safety, including sequential barriers to prevent radioactive material from entering the atmosphere [8]. They are presented in detail and described in INSAG-10 "Defense in Depth in Nuclear Safety" [9]. Before proceeding directly to the security levels, it is necessary to define deep-layered protection. Thus, D&D refers to a system of physical barriers to the spread of ionizing radiation and RV into the environment and a system of technical and organizational measures to protect barriers and preserve their effectiveness, as well as to protect personnel, the public and the environment. This concept includes 5 levels:
Level No. 1 is the prevention of violations of normal operation and failures, which is achieved through a conservative design and high quality construction and operation.
Level 2 — monitoring of violations of normal operation and failure detection. In this case, the means to achieve the goal are control, localization and protection systems.
Level 3 — accident control within the design framework. To implement this level, safety engineering and emergency procedures are required.
Level No. 4 — control of severe conditions of the plant, including prevention of accident development and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents. As in the case of the third level, No. 4 also requires engineering and technical means, but with the application of additional measures and procedures for accident management.
Level 5 — Mitigation of the radiological effects of significant releases of radioactive materials. Unlike other stages, in this case, off-site actions are meant during emergency response.
These levels are necessary for the implementation of a safety system at modern nuclear power plants, which are taken into account in the design basis during the design, construction and operation of the plant. Their advantage lies in the absence of a clear technical framework prescribed in INSAG-3, which makes it possible to expand the scope of application, including with respect to patents.
While such documents form the basis of the safety systems of modern nuclear installations, in particular nuclear power plants, the IAEA implements documents with a more detailed view of safety, most of which are exclusively related to ground stations. Examples include: Specific Safety Requirements (SSR series); Safety Requirements (NS-R series); General Safety Requirements (GSR series); Specific Safety Guide (SSG series); General Safety Guide (GSG series); and the INSAG series of standards [10].
In the case of the FNPP, the main problem is the technical inconsistency, or rather the difference with ground-based types of nuclear power plants, which often becomes a stumbling block for the applicability of those technical safety requirements that apply to nuclear power plants located on the earth's surface. Thus, for the effective distribution of floating nuclear thermal power plants, which can serve as the key to achieving not only carbon neutrality, but also the fulfillment of a number of UN Sustainable Development Goals, it is necessary to update the existing regulatory framework, both in the field of navigation and in the field of ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities, taking into account the specifics of the operation of small modular reactors used at the FNPP, and the location of the immediate site. In some cases, for example, when producing hydrogen using nuclear power or desalination of water, regulatory documents are also needed regarding the safety and reliability of these installations, since their work is directly related to ensuring the safety of the reactor and may differ from regional specifics, for example, water in the Persian Gulf is excessively polluted, which potentially it can lead to the failure of certain reverse osmosis system installations and as a result, to affect the safety of personnel and the environment [11]. In this regard, it is also necessary to separate the two circuits in order to avoid a chemical reaction that can eventually lead to irreparable consequences.

Conclusion
Summing up, it is worth emphasizing that the modern energy market is undergoing drastic changes, the emergence of new types of electricity generation, its accumulation and further transformation allow people to look at the development of their industries, states and the problem of energy security from a different perspective. However, a significant problem is that many experts, when talking about the development of modern technologies in this area, forget about one important component, namely, ensuring security, because Increasingly sophisticated designs of devices or installations include new components that react with certain elements and can serve as a catalyst for an accident. A striking example is the zirconium vapor reaction, a chemical reaction between steam and zirconium, which is relatively widespread and the assumption of which can lead to critical damage to nuclear power plants and, as a result, the release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere. Absolutely any modern industry has its own characteristic technical features that need to be studied in detail and taken into account when designing and creating safety standards.
Continuing the topic of security, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that with the development of modern technologies in the field of energy, potential threats are also actively developing, i.e. drones, weapons, explosives, etc. All this, in a certain situation, can be applied against nuclear power plants. Naval drones, which are widely used in the ranks of modern armies, equipped with the latest navigation technologies, a high degree of protection and capable of carrying a large payload, pose a high degree of threat to the FNPP. In this regard, booms are a potential level of protection, but their design and the material from which they will be constructed also require strict regulatory standards to ensure quality and efficiency. To this should be added the more common potential threats in the form of small submarines, widely used in the trade in weapons or narcotic substances, as well as piracy and combat formations, which are especially common in the western Indian Ocean and near trade routes. A striking example is the conflict in the Middle East between Yemen and the Western Coalition in late 2023 and early 2024.
Thus, as part of the further development of floating nuclear power plants directly, it is necessary to create a regulatory framework that would cover all safety issues, taking into account modern and potential threats, those requirements that are already prescribed in IMO and IAEA documents, but when drafting them, it is necessary to take into account the technical features of modern thermal power plants.